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NASH EQUILIBRIUM PROBLEMS OF POLYNOMIALS
JIAWANG NIE AND XINDONG TANG
Abstract. This paper studies Nash equilibrium problems that are given by
polynomial functions. We formulate efficient polynomial optimization prob-
lems for computing Nash equilibria. The Lasserre type Moment-SOS relax-
ations are used to solve them. Under generic assumptions, the method can
find a Nash equilibrium if there is one. Moreover, it can find all Nash equi-
libria if there are finitely many ones of them. The method can also detect
nonexistence if there is no Nash equilibrium.
1. Introduction
The Nash Equilibrium Problem (NEP) is a kind of games for finding strategies
for a group of players such that each player’s objective is optimized, for given other
players’ strategies. Suppose there are N players and the ith player’s strategy is the
variable xi ∈ Rni (the ni-dimensional real Euclidean space). We denote that
xi := (xi,1, . . . , xi,ni), x := (x1, . . . , xN ).
The total dimension of all players’ strategies is
n : = n1 + · · ·+ nN .
When the ith player’s strategy xi is being optimized, we use x−i to denote the
subvector of all players’ strategies except xi, i.e.,
x−i := (x1, . . . , xi−1, xi+1, . . . , xN ),
and write x = (xi, x−i) accordingly. When the writing x−i appears, the ith player’s
strategy is being considered for optimization, while the vector of all other players’
strategy is fixed to be x−i. In a NEP, the ith player’s best strategy xi is a minimizer
for the optimization problem
(1.1) Fi(x−i) :

min
xi∈Rni
fi(xi, x−i)
s .t . gi,j(xi) = 0 (j ∈ Ei),
gi,j(xi) ≥ 0 (j ∈ Ii),
for given x−i of other players’ strategies. In the above, fi is the ith player’s objective
function, and gi,j are constraining functions in xi. The Ei and Ii are disjoint labeling
sets of finite cardinalities (possibly empty). The feasible set of the optimization
Fi(x−i) in (1.1) is
(1.2) Xi := {xi ∈ R
ni : gi,j(xi) = 0 (j ∈ Ei), gi,j(xi) ≥ 0 (j ∈ Ii)}.
It is called the feasible strategy set for the ith player. For NEPs, each set Xi does
not depend on x−i. This is different from generalized Nash Equilibrium problems
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(GNEPs), where each player’s feasible set depends on other players’ strategies. The
entire strategy vector x is a feasible point if
x = (x1, . . . , xN ) ∈ X1 × · · · ×Xn,
that is, each xi ∈ Xi. The NEP can be formulated as
(1.3) find x∗ ∈ Rn such that each x∗i is a minimizer ofFi(x
∗
−i),
where x∗ = (x∗1, . . . , x
∗
N ). A solution of (1.3) is called a Nash Equilibrium (NE).
When all the defining functions fi and gi,j are polynomials in x, the NEP is then
called a Nash Equilibrium Problem of Polynomials (NEPP). The following is an
example.
Example 1.1. Consider the 2-player NEP with the individual optimization
1st player:
{
min
x1∈R2
x1,1(x1,1 + x2,1 + 4x2,2) + 2x
2
1,2,
s .t . 1− (x1,1)2 − (x1,2)2 ≥ 0,
2nd player:
{
min
x2∈R2
x2,1(x1,1 + 2x1,2 + x2,1) + x2,2(2x1,1 + x1,2 + x2,2),
s .t . 1− (x2,1)2 − (x2,2)2 ≥ 0.
This NEP has only 3 NEs (see Section 3.3), which are
1st NE: x∗1 = (0, 0), x
∗
2 = (0, 0);
2nd NE: x∗1 = (1, 0), x
∗
2 =
1√
5
(−1,−2);
3rd NE: x∗1 = (−1, 0), x
∗
2 =
1√
5
(1, 2).
It is interesting to note that each player’s objective is strictly convex with respect to
its strategy, because their Hessian’s with respect to their own strategies are positive
definite.
When each feasible setXi is a finite set, the NEP is called a finite game. For finite
games, Nash Equilibria typically do not exist. People are also interested in mixed
strategies, which are probability distributions on the strategy set. Mixed strategy
solutions always exist for finite games [41]. For the case that f1+ · · ·+ fN = 0, the
NEP (1.3) is called a zero-sum game. The two-player zero-sum game is equivalent to
a saddle point problem [47]. NEPs have broad applications in Economics modelling
[3, 38, 53, 58, 61]. Applications outside Economics can be found in [5, 6, 19, 37, 55].
We refer to [2, 4, 11, 39, 48, 52] for more general work on NEPs.
It is generally hard to solve NEPs [10, 54]. For solving finite games or finding
their mixed strategy solutions, we refer to the work [1, 12, 25, 34]. For two-player
zero sum games, the NEPs are equivalent to saddle point problems and there are
optimization methods for solving them [8,47]. More work for solving NEPs can be
found in [20,24,26,27,35,36,51,60]. Moreover, NEPs are special cases of generalized
Nash Equilibrium problems. We refer to [13–15, 17, 18, 40, 49] for recent work on
GNEPs. In the current state of the art, it is mostly an open question to solve
general NEPs efficiently, especially those whose individual optimization problems
are nonconvex.
Contributions This paper focuses on Nash equilibrium problems that are given
by polynomial functions, i.e., the objectives fi and constraining functions gi,j are
polynomial functions in their variables. We formulate efficient polynomial optimiza-
tion for computing one or more Nash equilibria. The Lasserre type Moment-SOS
hierarchy of semidefinite relaxations are used to solve the polynomial optimization.
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Under generic assumptions, we prove the method can find a Nash equilibrium if
there exists one. Moreover, we can also find all Nash equilibria if there are finitely
many ones of them. The method can also detect nonexistence if there is no Nash
equilibrium. For NEPs that are given by generic polynomials, we further show that
there are finitely many complex KKT points. Therefore, there are at most finitely
many NEs for generic NEPPs. This implies that our method can solve general
NEPPs successfully.
The paper is organized as follows. Some preliminaries about polynomial opti-
mization are given in Section 2. We give efficient polynomial optimization formu-
lations in Section 3. We show how to solve polynomial optimization problems for
their optimizers by the Moment-SOS hierarchy in Section 4. Numerical experiments
and applications are given in Section 5. Conclusions and discussions are proposed
in Section 6. In the appendix, we prove that NEPs have finitely many complex
KKT points, when the functions are given by generic polynomials.
2. Preliminaries
Notation The symbol N (resp., R, C) stands for the set of nonnegative integers
(resp., real numbers, complex numbers). For a positive integer k, denote the set
[k] := {1, . . . , k}. For a real number t, ⌈t⌉ (resp., ⌊t⌋) denotes the smallest integer
not smaller than t (resp., the biggest integer not bigger than t). For the ith player’s
strategy variable xi ∈ Rni , the xi,j denotes the jth entry of xi, j = 1, . . . , ni.
Let R[x] (resp., C[x]) denotes the ring of polynomials with real (resp., complex)
coefficients in x. Let R[x]d (resp., C[x]d) denotes its subset of polynomials whose
degrees are not greater than d. For the ith player’s strategy vector xi, the notation
R[xi], C[xi], R[xi]d, C[xi]d are defined in the same way. For ith player’s objective
fi(xi, x−i), the notation ∇xifi, ∇
2
xi
fi respectively denote its gradient and Hessian
with respect to xi.
In the following, we use the letter z to represent either x or xi for convenience
of discussion. Suppose z := (z1, . . . , zl) and α := (α1, . . . , αl) ∈ Nl, denote
zα := zα11 · · · z
αl
l , |α| := α1 + . . .+ αl.
For an integer d > 0, denote the monomial power set
N
l
d := {α ∈ N
l : |α| ≤ d}.
We use [z]d to denote the vector of all monomials in z and whose degree is at most
d, ordered in the graded alphabetical ordering. For example, if z = (z1, z2), then
[z]3 = (1, z1, z2, z
2
1 , z1z2, z
2
2 , z
3
1 , z
2
1z2, z1z
2
2 , z
3
2).
Throughout the paper, the word generic is used for a property if it holds for all but
a set of Lebesgue measure zero in the space of input data.
2.1. Ideals and positive polynomials. Let F = R or C. For a polynomial
p ∈ F[z] and subsets I, J ⊆ F[z], define the product and Minkowski sum
p · I := {pq : q ∈ I}, I + J := {a+ b : a ∈ I, b ∈ J}.
The subset I is an ideal if p · I ⊆ I for all p ∈ F[z] and I + I ⊆ I. For a tuple of
polynomials q = (q1, . . . , qm), the set
Ideal[q] := q1 · F[z] + . . .+ qm · F[z]
is the ideal generated by q, which is the smallest ideal containing each qi.
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We review basic concepts in polynomial optimization. A polynomial σ ∈ R[z] is
said to be a sum of squares (SOS) if σ = s21 + s
2
2 + . . . + s
2
k for some polynomials
s1, . . . , sk ∈ R[z]. The set of all SOS polynomials in z is denoted as Σ[z]. For a
degree d, we denote the truncation
Σ[z]d := Σ[z] ∩R[z]d.
For a tuple g = (g1, . . . , gt) of polynomials in z, its quadratic module is the set
Qmod[g] := Σ[z] + g1 · Σ[z] + . . .+ gt · Σ[z].
Similarly, we denote the truncation of Qmod(g)
Qmod[g]2d := Σ[z]2d + g1 · Σ[z]2d−deg(g1) + · · ·+ gt · Σ[z]2d−deg(gt).
The tuple g determines the basic closed semi-algebraic set
(2.1) S(g) := {z ∈ Rl : g(z) ≥ 0}.
For a tuple h = (h1, . . . , hs) of polynomials in R[z], its real zero set is
Z(h) := {u ∈ Rl : h1(u) = · · · = hs(u) = 0}.
The set Ideal[h] + Qmod[g] is said to be archimedean if there exists ρ ∈ Ideal[h] +
Qmod[g] such that the set S(ρ) is compact. If Ideal[h] + Qmod[g] is archimedean,
then Z(h) ∩ S(g) must be compact. Conversely, if Z(h) ∩ S(g) is compact, say,
Z(h) ∩ S(g) is contained in the ball R − ‖z‖2 ≥ 0, then Ideal(h) + Qmod(g,R −
‖z‖2) is archimedean and Z(h) ∩ S(g) = Z(h) ∩ S(g,R − ‖z‖2). Clearly, if f ∈
Ideal[h] +Qmod[g], then f ≥ 0 on Z(h)∩S(g). The reverse is not necessarily true.
However, when Ideal[h]+Qmod[g] is archimedean, if f > 0 on Z(h)∩S(g), then f ∈
Ideal[h] + Qmod[g]. This conclusion is referenced as Putinar’s Positivestellensatz
[50]. Interestingly, if f ≥ 0 on Z(h) ∩ S(g), we also have f ∈ Ideal[h] + Qmod[g],
under some standard optimality conditions [45].
2.2. Localizing and moment matrices. Let RN
l
2d denote the space of all real
vectors that are labeled by α ∈ Nl2d. Each y ∈ R
N
l
2d is labeled as
y = (yα)α∈Nl
2d
.
Such y is called a truncated multi-sequence (tms) of degree 2d. For a polynomial
f =
∑
α∈Nl
2d
fαz
α ∈ R[z]2d, define the operation
(2.2) 〈f, y〉 =
∑
α∈Nl
2d
fαyα.
The operation 〈f, y〉 is a bilinear function in (f, y). For a polynomial q ∈ R[z] with
deg(q) ≤ 2k and the integer
t = k − ⌈deg(q)/2⌉,
the outer product q · [z]t([z]t)T is a symmetric matrix polynomial in z, with length(
n+t
t
)
. We write the expansion as
q · [z]t([z]t)
T =
∑
α∈Nl
2d
zαQα,
for some symmetric matrices Qα. Then we define the matrix function
(2.3) L(d)q [y] :=
∑
α∈Nl
2d
yαQα.
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It is called the kth localizing matrix of q and generated by y. For given q, L
(d)
q [y] is
linear in y. Clearly, if q(u) ≥ 0 and y = [u]2d, then
L(d)q [y] = q(u)[u]t[u]
T
t  0.
For instance, if l = d = 2 and q = 1− z1 − z1z2, then
L(2)q [y] =
y00 − y10 − y11 y10 − y20 − y21 y01 − y11 − y12y10 − y20 − y21 y20 − y30 − y31 y11 − y21 − y22
y01 − y11 − y12 y11 − y21 − y22 y02 − y12 − y13
 .
When q is the constant one polynomial, the localizing matrix L
(d)
1 [y] reduces to a
moment matrix, which we denote as
Md[y] := L
(d)
1 [y].
For instance, for n = 2 and y ∈ RN
2
4 , we have M0[y] = [y00],
M1[y] =
 y00 y10 y01y10 y20 y11
y01 y11 y02
 , M2[y] =

y00 y10 y01 y20 y11 y02
y10 y20 y11 y30 y21 y12
y01 y11 y02 y21 y12 y03
y20 y30 y21 y40 y31 y22
y11 y21 y12 y31 y22 y13
y02 y12 y03 y22 y13 y04
 .
3. Polynomial optimization formulations
In this section, we show how to formulate efficient polynomial optimization for
solving the NEP (1.3).
3.1. Optimality conditions for individual optimization. Consider the ith
player’s individual optimization problem Fi(x−i) in (1.1), for given x−i. For con-
venience, we write the constraining functions as
gi(xi) := (gi,1(xi), . . . , gi,mi(xi)).
Suppose x∗ = (x∗1, . . . , x
∗
N ) is a NE. Under linear independence constraint quali-
fication condition (LICQC) at x∗i , i.e., the set of gradients for active constraining
functions are linearly independent, there exist Lagrange multipliers λ∗i,j such that
(3.1)
{ ∑mi
j=1 λ
∗
ij∇xigi,j(x
∗
i ) = ∇xifi(x
∗),
0 ≤ λ∗i,j ⊥ gi,j(x
∗
i ) ≥ 0 (j ∈ Ii).
The above is the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) condition for the optimizationFi(x
∗
−i).
The x∗ satisfying (3.1) is called a KKT point. So x∗ and λ∗i,j satisfy the following
polynomial system (i = 1, . . . , N)
(3.2)

∇xigi,1 ∇xigi,2 · · · ∇xigi,mi
gi,1(x) 0 · · · 0
0 gi,2(x) · · · 0
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 · · · gi,mi(x)

︸ ︷︷ ︸
Gi(xi)

λi,1
λi,2
...
λi,mi

︸ ︷︷ ︸
λi
=

∇xifi
0
...
0

︸ ︷︷ ︸
fˆi(x)
.
Therefore, if there exists a matrix polynomial Hi(xi) such that
(3.3) Hi(xi)Gi(xi) = Imi ,
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then we can express λi as
λi = Hi(xi)Gi(xi)λi = Hi(xi)fˆi(x).
Interestingly, the matrix polynomial Hi(xi) satisfying (3.3) exists under the non-
singularity condition on gi. The polynomial tuple gi is said to be nonsingular if
Gi(xi) has full column rank for all xi ∈ Cni [46]. It is a generic condition. We
remark that if gi is nonsingular, then the LICQC holds at every minimizer of (1.1),
so there must exist λi,j satisfying (3.1) and we can express λi,j as
(3.4) λi,j = λi,j(x) :=
(
Hi(xi)fˆi(x)
)
j
for all NEs.
Throughout the paper, we assume that every constraining polynomial tuple gi is
nonsingular. This is a generic assumption. So λi,j(x) can be expressed as polyno-
mials as in (3.4). Then, each Nash equilibrium x∗ satisfies the following polynomial
systems (i = 1, . . . , N)
(3.5) (Si) :

∇xifi(x) −
∑mi
j=1 λij(x)∇xigi,j(xi) = 0,
gi,j(xi) = 0 (j ∈ Ei), λi,j(x)gi,j(xi) = 0 (j ∈ Ii),
gi,j(xi) ≥ 0 (j ∈ Ii), λi,j(x) ≥ 0 (j ∈ Ii).
The above are necessary conditions for NEs. When every optimization in (1.1) is
convex, the (3.5) are sufficient conditions for NEs.
3.2. Optimization based on KKT conditions. The main task for NEP is to
find a tuple x∗ = (x∗1, . . . , x
∗
N ) such that each x
∗
i is a minimizer for the optimization
problem Fi(x
∗
−i). We assume each constraining tuple gi is nonsingular. Then x
∗
must satisfy the polynomial system (3.5). Choose a generic positive definite matrix
Θ ∈ R(n+1)×(n+1).
Then we consider the following optimization problem
(3.6)

min
x
[x]T1 ·Θ · [x]1
s .t . ∇xifi(x)−
∑mi
j=1 λij(x)∇xigi,j(xi) = 0 (i ∈ [N ]),
gi,j(xi) = 0 (j ∈ Ei, i ∈ [N ]),
λi,j(x)gi,j(xi) = 0 (j ∈ Ii, i ∈ [N ]),
gi,j(xi) ≥ 0 (j ∈ Ii, i ∈ [N ]),
λi,j(x) ≥ 0 (j ∈ Ii, i ∈ [N ]).
In the above, the vector [x]1 =
[
1 xT
]T
∈ Rn+1. Under the nonsingularity as-
sumptions on gi, every Nash equilibrium x
∗ is a feasible point of (3.6), while the
converse is typically not true. However, for every feasible point x of (3.6), the xi
is a critical point for the optimization Fi(x−i). It is important to observe that if
(3.6) is infeasible, then there are no NEs. If (3.6) is feasible, then it must have a
minimizer, because its objective is a positive definite quadratic function. Moreover,
for generic Θ, the minimizer of (3.6) is unique.
Assume that u := (u1, . . . , uN) is an optimizer of (3.6). If each ui is a minimizer
for the optimization problem Fi(u−i), then u is a NE. To this end, for each player,
consider the optimization problem:
(3.7)

ωi := min fi(xi, u−i)− fi(ui, u−i)
s .t . gi,j(xi) = 0 (j ∈ Ei),
gi,j(xi) ≥ 0 (j ∈ Ii).
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If all the optimal values ωi ≥ 0, then u is a Nash Equilibrium. However, if one of
them is negative, say, ωi < 0, then u is not a NE. Let Ui be a set of some optimizers
of (3.7), then u violates the following inequalities
(3.8) fi(xi, x−i) ≤ fi(v, x−i) (v ∈ Ui).
However, every Nash equilibrium must satisfy (3.8).
When u is not a NE, we aim at finding a new candidate by posing the inequalities
in (3.8). Therefore, we consider the following optimization problem:
(3.9)

min
x
[x]T1 ·Θ · [x]1
s .t . ∇xifi(x)−
∑mi
j=1 λij(x)∇xigi,j(xi) = 0 (i ∈ [N ]),
gi,j(xi) = 0 (j ∈ Ei, i ∈ [N ]),
λi,j(x)gi,j(xi) = 0 (j ∈ Ii, i ∈ [N ]),
gi,j(xi) ≥ 0 (j ∈ Ii, i ∈ [N ]),
λi,j(x) ≥ 0 (j ∈ Ii, i ∈ [N ]),
fi(v, x−i)− fi(xi, x−i) ≥ 0 (v ∈ Ki, i ∈ [N ]).
In the above, each Ki is a set of some optimizers of (3.7). We can solve (3.9) again
for an optimizer. If it is verified to be a NE, then we are done. If it is not, we
can add more inequalities like (3.8). Repeating this procedure, we get the following
algorithm.
Algorithm 3.1. For the NEP given as in (1.1) and (1.3), do the following
Step 0 Initialize Ki := ∅ for all i and l := 0. Choose a generic positive definite
matrix Θ of length n+ 1.
Step 1 Solve the polynomial optimization problem (3.9). If it is infeasible, there is
no NE and stop; otherwise, solve it for an optimizer u.
Step 2 For each i = 1, . . . , N , solve the optimization (3.7). If all ωi ≥ 0, u is a NE
and stop. If one of ωi is negative, go to the next step.
Step 3 For each i with ωi < 0, obtain a set Ui of some (may not all) optimizers of
(3.7); then update the set Ki := Ki ∪ Ui. Let l := l + 1, then go to Step 1.
In the Step 0, we can set Θ = RTR for a randomly generated matrix R of
length n + 1. The objective in (3.9) is a positive definite quadratic function, so it
has a minimizer if (3.9) is feasible. The case is slightly different for (3.7). If the
feasible set Xi is compact or fi(xi, u−i) is coercive for the given u−i, then (3.7) has
a minimizer. If Xi is unbounded and fi(xi, u−i) is not coercive, it may be difficult
for computing the optimal value ωi. In applications, we are mostly interested in
cases that (3.7) has a minimizer, for the existence of a NE. In Section 4, we will
discuss how to solve the optimization problems in Algorithm 3.1, by the Lasserre
type Moment-SOS hierarchy of semidefinite relaxations.
The following is the convergence theorem.
Theorem 3.2. Assume each constraining polynomial tuple gi is nonsingular and
let λi,j(x) be Lagrange multiplier polynomials as in (3.4). Let G be the feasible set
of (3.6) and G∗ be the set of all NEs. If the complement G\G∗ is a finite set, i.e.,
the cardinality ℓ := |G\G∗| <∞, then Algorithm 3.1 must terminate within at most
ℓ loops.
Proof. Under the nonsingularity assumption of polynomial tuples gi, the Lagrange
multipliers λi,j can be expressed as polynomials λi,j(x) as in (3.4). For each u that
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is a feasible point of (3.6), every NE must satisfy the constraint
fi(ui, x−i)− fi(xi, x−i) ≥ 0.
Therefore, every NE must also be a feasible point of (3.9). Since the matrix Θ is
positive definite, the optimization (3.9) must have a minimizer, unless it is infeasi-
ble. When Algorithm 3.1 goes to a newer loop, say, from the lth to the (l + 1)th,
the optimizer u for (3.9) in the lth loop is no longer feasible for (3.9) in the (l+1)th
loop. This means that the feasible set of (3.9) must loose at least one point after
each loop, unless a NE is reached. Also note that the feasible set of (3.9) is con-
tained in G. If G\G∗ is a finite set, Algorithm 3.1 must terminate after some loops.
The number of loops is at most ℓ. 
When the polynomials fi, gi,j are generic, the NEP (1.3) has finitely many KKT
points, i.e., the feasible set of (3.6) is finite. This is shown in Theorem A.1 in the
Appendix. The assumptions in Theorem 3.2 are general.
3.3. Convex NEPs. An important class of NEPs is that each individual opti-
mization Fi(x−i) is a convex optimization problem, i.e., each objective fi(xi, x−i)
is a convex function in xi for given x−i, the equality constraining function gi,j(xi)
(j ∈ Ei) is linear in xi, and the inequality constraining function gi,j(xi) (j ∈ Ii) is
concave in xi. This requires that each player’s strategy set Xi is convex and
(3.10) fi(θa+ (1− θ)b, x−i) ≤ θfi(a, x−i) + (1− θ)fi(b, x−i),
for all a, b ∈ Xi, θ ∈ [0, 1], and for given x−i.
For convex optimization, the optimizers are equivalent to the KKT points, under
constraint qualification conditions (e.g., the Slater’s condition or the LICQC). In
particular, when the constraining polynomial is nonsingular, a point is a minimizer
if and only if it is a KKT point, which means that every feasible point of (3.6) is a
NE. Therefore, we get the following corollary.
Corollary 3.3. Assume each gi is a nonsingular tuple of polynomials. Suppose each
gi,j(xi) (j ∈ Ei) is linear, each gi,j(xi) (j ∈ Ii) is concave, and each fi(xi, x−i) is
convex in xi for given x−i. Then Algorithm 3.1 must terminate at the first loop
with l = 0, returning a NE or reporting that there is no NE.
For convex optimization problems, there are infinitely many optimizers unless
the optimizer is unique. Moreover, if the objective is strictly convex (i.e., the
inequality (3.10) holds strictly for all a 6= b, 0 < θ < 1), the optimizer is always
unique, if it exists. However, these conclusions are not true for convex NEPs. Even
if each player’s objective fi(xi, x−i) is strictly convex in xi for all given x−i, the
NEP might have finitely many NEs. This is the case for Example 1.1.
Example 3.4. Consider the 2-player NEP in Example 1.1. Each individual op-
timization is strictly convex, because the Hessian’s ∇2x1f1 and ∇
2
x2
f2 are positive
definite. The constraints are the convex ball conditions. The KKT system is
(3.11)

2x1,1 + x2,1 + 4x2,2 = −2λ1x1,1, 4x1,2 = −2λ1x1,2,
x1,1 + 2x1,2 + 2x2,1 = −2λ2x2,1, 2x1,1 + x1,2 + 2x2,2 = −2λ2x2,2,
λ1(1− (x1,1)2 − (x1,2)2) = 0, λ2(1− (x2,1)2 − (x2,2)2) = 0,
1− (x1,1)2 − (x1,2)2 ≥ 0, 1− (x2,1)2 − (x2,2)2 ≥ 0,
λ1 ≥ 0, λ2 ≥ 0.
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By solving the above directly, one can show that this NEP has only 3 NEs, together
with Lagrange multipliers as follows.
x∗1 = (0, 0), x
∗
2 = (0, 0), λ
∗
1 = λ
∗
2 = 0;
x∗1 = (1, 0), x
∗
2 =
1√
5
(−1,−2), λ∗1 =
9
√
5
10 − 1, λ
∗
2 =
√
5
2 − 1;
x∗1 = (−1, 0), x
∗
2 =
1√
5
(1, 2), λ∗1 =
9
√
5
10 − 1, λ
∗
2 =
√
5
2 − 1.
3.4. More Nash Equilibria. Algorithm 3.1 aims at finding a single NE. In some
applications, people may be interested in more NEs. For the case that there is a
unique NE, people are also interested in a certificate for the uniqueness. Here, we
give a procedure for computing more NEs or verifying the uniqueness.
Assume that x∗ is a Nash Equilibrium produced by Algorithm 3.1, i.e., x∗ is also
a minimizer of (3.9). Note that all KKT points x satisfying
[x]T1 Θ[x]1 < [x
∗]T1 Θ[x
∗]1
are excluded from the feasible set of (3.9) by the constraints
fi(ui, x−i)− fi(xi, x−i) ≥ 0 (∀u ∈ Ki, ∀ i ∈ [N ]).
If x∗ is an isolated NE (e.g., this is the case if there are finitely many NEs), there
exists a scalar δ > 0 such that
[x]T1 Θ[x]1 ≥ [x
∗]T1 Θ[x
∗]1 + δ
for all other NEs x. For such δ, we can try to find a different NE by solving the
following optimization problem
(3.12)

min
x
[x]T1 Θ[x]1
s .t . ∇xifi(x)−
∑mi
j=1 λij(x)∇xigi,j(xi) = 0 (i ∈ [N ]),
gi,j(xi) = 0 (j ∈ Ei, i ∈ [N ]),
λi,j(x)gi,j(xi) = 0 (j ∈ Ii, i ∈ [N ]),
gi,j(xi) ≥ 0 (j ∈ Ii, i ∈ [N ]),
λi,j(x) ≥ 0 (j ∈ Ii, i ∈ [N ]),
fi(v, x−i)− fi(xi, x−i) ≥ 0 (v ∈ Ki, i ∈ [N ]),
[x]T1 Θ[x]1 ≥ [x
∗]T1 Θ[x
∗]1 + δ.
When an optimizer of (3.12) is computed, we can check if it is a NE or not by
solving (3.7). If it is, we get a new NE that is different from x∗. If it is not, we can
union new points to the set Ki. Repeating the above process, we are able to get
more Nash equilibria.
A concern in computation is how to choose the constant δ > 0 for (3.12). We
want a value δ > 0 such that there is no other Nash Equilibrum u such that
[u]T1 Θ[u]1 ≤ [x
∗]T1 Θ[x
∗]1 + δ. To this end, we consider the following maximization
problem
(3.13)

max
x
[x]T1 Θ[x]1
s .t . ∇xifi(x)−
∑mi
j=1 λij(x)∇xigi,j(xi) = 0 (i ∈ [N ]),
gi,j(xi) = 0 (j ∈ Ei, i ∈ [N ]),
λi,j(x)gi,j(xi) = 0 (j ∈ Ii, i ∈ [N ]),
gi,j(xi) ≥ 0 (j ∈ Ii, i ∈ [N ]),
λi,j(x) ≥ 0 (j ∈ Ii, i ∈ [N ]),
fi(v, x−i)− fi(xi, x−i) ≥ 0 (v ∈ Ki, i ∈ [N ]),
[x]T1 Θ[x]1 ≤ [x
∗]T1 Θ[x
∗]1 + δ.
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Interestingly, if x∗ is also a maximizer of (3.13), then the feasible set of (3.12)
contains all NEs except x∗, under some general assumptions.
Proposition 3.5. Assume Θ is a generic positive definite matrix and x∗ is a
minimizer of (3.9).
(i) If x∗ is also a maximizer of (3.13), then there is no other Nash Equilibrium
u satisfying [u]T1 Θ[u]1 ≤ [x
∗]T1 Θ[x
∗]1 + δ.
(ii) If x∗ is an isolated KKT point, then there exists δ > 0 such that x∗ is also
a maximizer of (3.13).
Proof. Note that every NE is a feasible point of (3.9).
(i) If x∗ is also a maximizer of (3.13), then the objective [x]T1 Θ[x]1 achieves
a constant value in the following set of (3.13). If u is a Nash equilibrium with
[u]T1 Θ[u]1 ≤ [x
∗]T1 Θ[x
∗]1 + δ, then
[u]T1 Θ[u]1 = [x
∗]T1 Θ[x
∗]1.
This means that u is also a minimizer of (3.9). When Θ is a generic positive definite
matrix, the optimization (3.9) has a unique optimizer, so u = x∗.
(ii) Since Θ is positive definite, there exists ǫ > 0 such that
[x]T1 Θ[x]1 ≥ ǫ(1 + ‖x‖)
2
for all x. Let C =
√(
[x∗]T1 Θ[x∗]1
)
/ǫ, then the following set
T :=

y = [x]2
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∇xifi(x)−
∑mi
j=1 λij(x)∇xigi,j(xi) = 0 (i ∈ [N ]),
gi,j(xi) = 0 (j ∈ Ei, i ∈ [N ]),
λi,j(x)gi,j(xi) = 0 (j ∈ Ii, i ∈ [N ]),
gi,j(xi) ≥ 0 (j ∈ Ii, i ∈ [N ]),
λi,j(x) ≥ 0 (j ∈ Ii, i ∈ [N ]),
fi(v, x−i)− fi(xi, x−i) ≥ 0 (v ∈ Ki, i ∈ [N ]),
‖x‖ ≤ C

.
is compact. Note that [x∗]2 ∈ T . Let θ be the vector such that
[x]T1 Θ[x]1 = θ
T y
for all y = [x]2. Since x
∗ is an isolated KKT point, the y∗ := [x∗]2 is also an
isolated point of T . Then its subset
T1 := T \{y
∗}
is also a compact set. Since x∗ is a minimizer of (3.9), the hyperplane H := {θT y =
θT y∗} is a supporting hyperplane for the set T . Since Θ is generic, the optimization
(3.9) has a unique minimizer, which implies that y∗ is the unique minimizer of the
linear function θT y on T . So, H does not intersect T1 and their distance is positive.
There exists a scalar τ > 0 such that
[x]T1 Θ[x]1 = θ
T y ≥ θT y∗ + τ = [x∗]T1 Θ[x
∗]1 + τ
for all y = [x]2 ∈ T1. Then, for the choice δ := τ/2, the point x∗ is the only feasible
point for (3.13). Hence, x∗ is also a maximizer of (3.13). 
Proposition 3.5 shows the existence of δ > 0 such that (3.9) and (3.13) have the
same optimal value. However, it does not give a concrete lower bound for δ. In
computational practice, we can first give a priori value for δ. If it does not work,
we can decrease δ to a smaller value (e.g., let δ := δ/5). By repeating this, the
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optimization (3.13) will eventually have x∗ as a maximizer. The following is the
algorithm for an NE that is different from x∗.
Algorithm 3.6. Give an initial value for δ (say, 0.1).
Step 1: Solve the maximization problem (3.13). If its optimal value η equals
υ := [x∗]T1 Θ[x
∗]1, then go to Step 2. If η is bigger than υ, then let δ =
min(δ/5, η − υ) and repeat this step.
Step 2: Solve the optimization problem (3.12). If it is infeasible, then there
are no additional NEs; if it is feasible, solve it for a minimizer u.
Step 3: For each i = 1, . . . , N , solve the optimization (3.7) for the optimal
value ωi. If all ωi ≥ 0, stop and u is a NE. If one of ωi is negative, go to
Step 4.
Step 4: For each i ∈ [N ], update the set Ki := Ki ∪ Ui, and then go back to
Step 2.
When x∗ is not an isolated KKT point, there may not exist a satisfactory δ > 0
for the Step 1. For such a case, more investigation is required to verify uniqueness
of the NE or to find other NEs. However, for generic NEPs, there are finitely many
KKT points (see Theorem A.1 in the appendix). The following is the convergence
result for Algorithm 3.6.
Theorem 3.7. Under the same assumptions in Theorem 3.2, if Θ is a generic
positive definite matrix and x∗ is an isolated KKT point, then Algorithm 3.6 must
terminate after finitely many steps, returning a NE that is different from x∗ or
reporting the nonexistence of other NEs.
Proof. Under the given assumptions, Proposition 3.5(ii) shows the existence of
δ > 0 satisfactory for the Step 1 of Algorithm 3.6. Again, by Proposition 3.5(i),
the feasible set of (3.12) contains all NEs except x∗. The finite termination of
Algorithm 3.6 can be proved in the same way as for Theorem 3.2. 
Once a new NE is obtained, we can repeatedly apply Algorithm 3.6, to compute
more NEs, if they exist. In particular, if there are finitely many NEs, we can
eventually get all of them. Indeed, for generic NEPPs, the number of NEs is finite
(see Theorem A.1 in the appendix). We can assume the set of equilibria is
{x(1), . . . , x(s)}.
Without loss of generality, we can assume they are ordered as
[x(1)]T1 Θ[x
(1)]1 < · · · < [x
(s)]T1 Θ[x
(s)]1,
since Θ is generic. If the first r NEs, say, x(1), . . . ,x(r), are obtained, there exists
δ > 0 such that
[x(j)]T1 Θ[x
(j)]1 > [x
(r)]T1 Θ[x
(r)]1 + δ
for all j = r + 1, . . . , s. Therefore, if we apply Algorithm 3.6 with x∗ = x(r), the
next Nash equilibrium x(r+1) can be obtained, if it exists. Therefore, we have the
following conclusion.
Corollary 3.8. Under the assumptions of Theorem 3.7, if there are finitely many
Nash equilibria, then all of them can be found by applying Algorithm 3.6 repeatedly.
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4. The Moment-SOS hierarchy for solving optimization
In this section, we discuss how to solve the polynomial optimization problems
in Algorithms 3.1 and 3.6 by using the Lasserre type Moment-SOS hierarchy of
semidefinite relaxations. We assume the constraining polynomial tuples gi are all
nonsingular. Therefore, the Lagrange multipliers λi,j can be expressed as poly-
nomial functions λi,j(x) as in (3.4) for all Nash equilibria. Note that every Nash
equilibrium x∗ must satisfy the polynomial system (3.5).
4.1. The optimization for all players. We discuss how to solve the polynomial
optimization problems (3.9), (3.12) and (3.13), by using the Moment-SOS hierarchy
of semidefinite programming relaxations [28, 29, 31–33].
First, we discuss how to solve (3.12). Suppose the set Ki is given, for each player.
For notational convenience, denote the polynomial tuples
(4.1) Φi :=
{
∇xifi(x)−
mi∑
j=1
λij(x)∇xigij
}
∪
{
gi,j : j ∈ Ei
}
∪
{
λi,j(x) · gi,j : j ∈ Ii
}
,
(4.2) Ψi :=
{
gi,j : j ∈ Ii
}
∪
{
λi,j(x) : j ∈ Ii
}
∪
{
fi(v, x−i)− fi(xi, x−i) : v ∈ Ki
}
.
In the above, for a vector p = (p1, . . . , ps) of polynomials, the set {p} stands for
{p1, . . . , ps}, for notational convenience. Denote the unions
(4.3) Φ :=
N⋃
i=1
Φi, Ψ :=
N⋃
i=1
Ψi.
They are both finite sets of polynomials. Then, the optimization (3.9) can be
equivalently written as
(4.4)

ϑmin := min
x∈Rn
θ(x) := [x]T1 Θ[x]1
s .t . p(x) = 0 (∀ p ∈ Φ),
q(x) ≥ 0 (∀ q ∈ Ψ).
Denote the degree
d0 := max{⌈deg(p)/2⌉ : p ∈ Φ ∪Ψ}.
For a degree k ≥ d0, consider the the kth order moment relaxation for (4.4)
(4.5)

ϑk := min
y
〈θ, y〉
s .t . y0 = 1, L
(k)
p [y] = 0 (p ∈ Φ),
Md[y]  0, L
(k)
q [y]  0 (q ∈ Ψ),
y ∈ RN
n
2k .
Its dual optimization problem is the kth order SOS relaxation
(4.6)
{
max γ
s .t . θ − γ ∈ Ideal[Φ]2k +Qmod[Ψ]2k.
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For relaxation orders k = d0, d0+1, . . ., we get the Moment-SOS hierarchy of semi-
definite relaxations (4.5)-(4.6). This produces the following algorithm for solving
the polynomial optimization problem (4.4).
Algorithm 4.1. Let θ,Φ,Ψ be as in (4.4). Initialize k := d0.
Step 1: Solve the moment relaxation (4.5). If it is infeasible, (4.4) has no
feasible points and stop; otherwise, solve it for a minimizer y∗.
Step 2: Let u = (y∗e1 , . . . , y
∗
en
). If u is feasible for (4.4) and ϑk = θ(u), then
u is a minimizer of (4.4). Otherwise, let k := k + 1 and go to Step 1.
In the Step 2, ei denotes the labeling vector such that the ith entry is 1 while
all other entries are 0. For example, when n = 4, then ye2 = y0100.
The conclusions of Algorithm 4.1 are justified as follows. The optimization (4.5)
is a relaxation of (4.4). This is because if x is a feasible point of (4.4), then y = [x]2k
must be feasible for (4.5). Hence, if (4.5) is infeasible, then (4.4) must be infeasible,
which also implies the nonexistence of a NE. Moreover, the optimal value ϑk of
(4.5) is a lower bound for the minimum value of (4.4), i.e., ϑk ≤ θ(x) for all x that
is feasible for (4.4). In the Step 2, if u is feasible for (4.4) and ϑk = θ(u), then u
must be a minimizer of (4.4). The convergence of Algorithm 4.1 is shown as follows.
Theorem 4.2. Assume the matrix Θ is a generic positive definite matrix and
Ideal[Φ] +Qmod[Ψ] is archimedean.
(i) If the optimization (4.4) is infeasible, then the moment relaxation (4.5)
must be infeasible when the order k is big enough.
(ii) Suppose the optimization (4.4) is feasible. Let u(k) be the point u produced
in the Step 2 of Algorithm 4.1 in the kth loop. Then u(k) converges to the
unique minimizer of (4.4). In particular, if the real zero set of Φ is finite,
then u(k) is the unique minimizer of (4.4), when k is sufficiently large.
Proof. (i) If (4.4) is infeasible, the constant polynomial −1 can be viewed as a
positive polynomial on the feasible set of (4.4). Since Ideal[Φ] + Qmod[Ψ] is
archimedean, we have −1 ∈ Ideal[Φ]2k + Qmod[Ψ]2k, for k big enough, by the
Putinar’s Positivstellensatz [50]. For such big k, the SOS relaxation (4.6) is un-
bounded from above, hence the moment relaxation (4.5) must be infeasible.
(ii) When the optimization (4.4) is feasible, it must have a unique minimizer,
say, x∗, because its objective is a generic positive definite quadratic polynomial.
The convergence of u(k) to x∗ is shown in [56] or [43, Theorem 3.3]. For the special
case that Φ(x) = 0 has finitely many real solutions, the point u(k) must be equal
to x∗, when k is large enough. This is shown in [30] (also see [44]). 
The archimedeanness of Ideal[Φ] + Qmod[Ψ] is essentially requiring that the
feasible set of (4.4) is compact. If the real zero set of Φ is compact, then Ideal[Φ]+
Qmod[Ψ] must be archimedean. In particular, if the NEPP has finitely many
real KKT points, then Ideal[Φ] + Qmod[Ψ] is archimedean. Interestingly, when
the objective and constraining polynomials are generic, there are finitely many
KKT points. See Theorem A.1 in the appendix. In fact, as shown in the proof of
Theorem A.1, the zero set of Φ is finite for generic NEPPs, and hence Algorithm 4.1
has finite convergence.
The other polynomial optimization problem (3.12) can be solved in the same
way by the Moment-SOS hierarchy of semidefinte relaxations like (4.5)-(4.6). The
convergence property is the same. For cleanness of the paper, we omit the details.
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For the maximization (3.13), we denote the set of polynomials
(4.7) Φ :=
N⋃
i=1
Φi, Ψ :=
N⋃
i=1
Ψi ∪
{
[x∗]T1 Θ[x
∗]1 + δ − [x]T1 Θ[x]1
}
.
Then (3.13) can be equivalently written as
(4.8)

ϑmin := min
x∈Rn
θ(x) := −[x]T1 Θ[x]1
s .t . p(x) = 0 (∀ p ∈ Φ),
q(x) ≥ 0 (∀ q ∈ Ψ).
Similarly, the hierarchy of moment relaxations (4.5) can be used to solve (4.8). The
following is the algorithm.
Algorithm 4.3. Let Φ,Ψ, θ be as in (4.7)-(4.8). Initialize k := d0.
Step 1: Solve the moment relaxation (4.5) for the minimum value ϑk and a
minimizer y∗ and let t := d0.
Step 2: If ϑk ≥ −[x∗]T1 Θ[x
∗]1, stop; otherwise, go to Step 3.
Step 3: If y∗ satisfies the rank condition
(4.9) rankMt[y
∗] = rankMt−d0 [y
∗],
then extract a set Ui of r := rankMt(y
∗) minimizers for (4.8)) and stop.
Step 4: If (4.9) fails to hold and t < k, let t := t+ 1 and then go to Step 3;
otherwise, let k := k + 1 and go to Step 1.
The optimization (4.8) is always feasible because x∗ is a feasible point. Therefore,
the moment relaxation (4.5) is also feasible. Since the minimum value ϑk is a lower
bound of ϑmin, if ϑk ≥ −[x∗]T1 Θ[x
∗]1, then
ϑk = ϑmin = −[x
∗]T1 Θ[x
∗]1
and hence x∗ is a maximizer of (3.13). In Step 3, the rank condition (4.9) is
called flat truncation [43]. It is a sufficient (and almost necessary) condition to
check convergence of moment relaxations. When (4.9) holds, the method in [22]
can be used to extract r minimizers for (4.8)). The method is implemented in the
software GloptPoly [23]. Moreover, Algorithms 4.1 and 4.3 can be implemented in
GloptPoly.
The convergence of Algorithm 4.3 is as follows. Note that Ideal(Φ)+Qmod(Ψ) is
archimedean, since it contains the polynomial [x∗]T1 Θ[x
∗]1 + δ − [x]T1 Θ[x]1. There-
fore, we always have ϑk → ϑmin as k → ∞ [28]. Under some classical optimality
conditions, we have ϑk = ϑmin when k is large enough [45]. Moreover, if the real
zero set of Φ is finite, then Algorithm 4.3 has finite convergence [44].
4.2. Checking Nash equilibria. Suppose u is a minimizer of (3.9). To check if
u = (ui, u−i) is a NE or not, we need to solve the individual optimization (3.7) for
each player. For notational convenience, we denote the polynomial tuples
(4.10) Hi(u) :=
{
gi,j : j ∈ Ei
}
∪
{
λi,j(xi, u−i) · gi,j : j ∈ Ii
}
∪
{
∇xifi(xi, u−i)−
mi∑
j=1
λij(xi, u−i)∇xigij
}
,
(4.11) Gi(u) :=
{
gi,j : j ∈ Ii
}
∪
{
λi,j(xi, u−i) : j ∈ Ii
}
.
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Like the earlier case, the set {p} stands for {p1, . . . , ps}, when p = (p1, . . . , ps) is
a vector of polynomial. The sets Hi(u), Gi(u) are finite collections of polynomials
in xi and parameterized by u. If the optimization (3.7) has a minimizer, then it is
equivalent to the following optimization
(4.12)

ωi := min
xi∈Rni
fi(xi, u−i)
s .t . p(xi) = 0 (p ∈ Hi(u)),
q(xi) ≥ 0 (q ∈ Gi(u)).
The above is a polynomial optimization problem in xi. Denote the degree for its
constraining polynomials
(4.13) di := max
{
⌈deg(p)/2⌉ : p ∈ Hi(u) ∪Gi(u)
}
.
For a degree k ≥ di, the kth order moment relaxation for (4.4) is
(4.14)

ω
(k)
i := min
y
〈fi(xi, u−i), y〉
s .t . y0 = 1, L
(k)
p [y] = 0 (p ∈ Hi(u)),
Mk[y]  0, L
(k)
q [y]  0 (q ∈ Gi(u)),
y ∈ RN
ni
2k .
Its dual optimization problem is the kth order SOS relaxation
(4.15)
{
max γ
s .t . fi(xi, u−i)− γ ∈ Ideal[Hi(u)]2k +Qmod[Gi(u)]2k.
By solving the above relaxations for k = di, di + 1, . . ., we get the Moment-SOS
hierarchy of relaxations (4.14)-(4.15). This gives the following algorithm.
Algorithm 4.4. For the ith player’s individual optimization (4.12), assume u is a
minimizer of (3.9).
Step 0: Construct the sets Hi(u), Gi(u) of polynomials as in (4.10), (4.11).
Initialize k := di.
Step 1: Solve the moment relaxation (4.14) for the minumum value ω
(k)
i and
a minimizer y∗. If ω(k)i ≥ 0, then ωi = 0 and stop; otherwise, go to the
next step.
Step 2: Let t := di as in (4.13). If y
∗ satisfies the rank condition
(4.16) rankMt[y
∗] = rankMt−di [y
∗],
then extract a set Ui of r := rankMt(y
∗) minimizers for (4.12)) and stop.
Step 3: If (4.16) fails to hold and t < k, let t := t+ 1 and then go to Step 2;
otherwise, let k := k + 1 and go to Step 1.
We would like to remark that the optimization (4.12) is always feasible, because
u is a minimizer of (3.9). The moment relaxation (4.14) is also feasible. Because
ω
(k)
i is a lower bound for ωi, and ωi ≤ fi(ui, u−i) = 0, if ω
(k)
i ≥ 0, then ωi must be
0. The Algorithm 4.4 can be implemented in GloptPoly. The following theorem is
the convergence for Algorithm 4.4. Its proof follows from [47, Theorem 4.4].
Theorem 4.5. Assume the ith player’s constraining polynomial tuple gi is nons-
ingluar and its optimization (3.7) has a minimizer for the given u−i. Assume either
one of the following conditions hold:
(i) The set Ideal[Hi(u)] +Qmod[Gi(u)] is archimedean,
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(ii) The real zero set of polynomials in Hi(u) is finite.
If each minimizer of (3.7) is an isolated critical point, then all minimizers of
(4.14) must satisfy the flat truncation (4.16), for all k big enough. Therefore,
Algorithm 4.4 must terminate within finitely many loops.
We would like to remark the following inclusion
Ideal[gi,j : j ∈ Ei] ⊆ Ideal[Hi(u)], Qmod[gi,j : j ∈ Ii] ⊆ Qmod[Gi(u)].
If Ideal[gi,j : j ∈ Ei] + Qmod[gi,j : j ∈ Ii] is archimedean, then Ideal[Hi(u)] +
Qmod[Gi(u)] is also archimedean. Therefore, if the archimedeanness holds for the
ith player’s optimization (1.1), then the condition (i) in Theorem 4.5 is satisfied.
5. Numerical Experiments
This section reports numerical experiments for solving NEPs by using Algo-
rithm 3.1 and 3.6. We apply the software GloptiPoly 3 [23] and SeDuMi [59] to
solve the Moment-SOS relaxations for the polynomial optimization (3.9), (3.7),
(3.12) and (3.13). The computation is implemented in an Alienware Aurora R8
desktop, with an Intel® Core(TM) i7-9700 CPU at 3.00GHz×8 and 16GB of RAM,
in a Windows 10 operating system. To implement Algorithm 3.1, we need Lagrange
multiplier representations as in [46]. The following cases are frequently used.
• For the constraint {xi ∈ Rni :
∑ni
j=1 xi,j ≤ 1, xi ≥ 0}, the constraining
polynomials are gi,0 = 1 −
∑ni
j=1 xi,j , gi,1 = xi,1, · · · , gi,ni = xi,ni . The
Lagrange multipliers λi,j can be represented as
λi,0 = x
T
i ∇xifi, λi,j =
∂fi
∂xi,j
− xTi ∇xifi, j = 1, . . . , ni.
• For the sphere constraint 1− xTi xi = 0 or the ball constraint 1− x
T
i xi ≥ 0,
the constraining polynomial is gi,1 = 1− xTi xi and the Lagrange multiplier
can be expressed as λi,1 = −
1
2x
T
i ∇xifi.
In Step 2 of Algorithm 3.1 and Step 3 of Algorithm 3.6, if the optimal value ωi ≥ 0
for all players, then the point u is a NE. In numerical computation, we cannot have
ωi ≥ 0 exactly, due to round-off errors. Therefore, we use the parameter
ω∗ := min
i=1,...,N
ωi
to measure the accuracy of the computed NE. Typically, if ω∗ is small, say, ω∗ ≥
−10−6, we regard the computed solution as an accurate NE.
For the convex NEP in Example 1.1, Algorithm 3.6 found all the 3 NEs correctly
with ω∗ = −1.9512 · 10−9. The following is another example of convex NEPs.
Example 5.1. Consider the convex NEP
1st player:
{
min
x1∈R2
x1,1(x1,1 + x2,1 + 4x2,2) + 4x
2
1,2,
s .t . 1− (x1,1)
2 − (x1,2)
2 ≥ 0,
2nd player:

min
x2∈R2
2x22,1 + 2x
2
2,2 + (x1,1 − 2x1,2)x2,1
+(4x1,1 + x1,2)x2,2,
s.t. 1− x2,1 − x2,2 ≥ 0, x2,1 ≥ 0, x2,2 ≥ 0.
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For the second player, the Lagrange multipliers can be represented as
λ2,1 = −∇x2f
T
2 x2, λ2,2 =
∂f2
∂x2,1
+ λ2,1, λ2,3 =
∂f2
∂x2,2
+ λ2,1.
For this NEP, Algorithm 3.6, found two NEs:
x∗1 = (0.0000,−0.0000), x
∗
2 = (0.0000, 0.0000), ω
∗ = −7.4772 · 10−9;
x∗1 = (−1.0000,−0.0000), x
∗
2 = (0.1250, 0.8750), ω
∗ = −3.3640 · 10−8.
The computation took about 1 second.
Example 5.2. Consider the 2-player NEP
1st player:
{
min
x1∈R3
∑3
j=1 x1,j(x1,j − j · x2,j)
s.t. 1− x1,1x1,2 ≥ 0, 1− x1,2x1,3 ≥ 0, x1,1 ≥ 0,
2nd player:

min
x2∈R3
∏3
j=1 x2,j +
∑
1≤i<j≤3
1≤k≤3
x1,ix1,jx2,k +
∑
1≤i≤3
1≤j<k≤3
x1,ix2,jx2,k
s.t. 1− (x2,1)2 − (x2,2)2 = 0.
The first player’s optimization is non-convex, with an unbounded feasible set. The
Lagrange multipliers for the first player’s optimization are
λ1,1 = (1− x1,1x1,2)
∂f1
∂x1,1
, λ1,2 = −x1,1
∂f1
∂x1,2
, λ1,3 = x1,1
∂f1
∂x1,1
− x1,2
∂f1
∂x1,2
.
Applying Algorithm 3.6, we get four NEs:
x∗1 = (0.3198, 0.6396,−0.6396), x
∗
2 = (0.6396, 0.6396,−0.4264);
x∗1 = (0.0000, 0.3895, 0.5842), x
∗
2 = (−0.8346, 0.3895, 0.3895);
x∗1 = (0.2934,−0.5578, 0.8803), x
∗
2 = (0.5869,−0.5578, 0.5869);
x∗1 = (0.0000,−0.5774,−0.8660), x
∗
2 = (−0.5774,−0.5774,−0.5774).
Their accuracy parameters are respectively
−7.1879 · 10−8, −3.5040 · 10−7, −4.3732 · 10−7,−6.4360 · 10−7.
It took about 30 seconds. If the second player’s objective becomes
−
3∏
j=1
x2,j +
∑
1≤i≤3
1≤j<k≤3
x1,ix2,jx2,k −
∑
1≤i<j≤3
1≤k≤3
x1,ix1,jx2,k,
then there is no NE, which is detected by Algorithm 3.1. It took around 16 seconds.
Example 5.3. Consider the 3-player NEP
1st player:

min
x1∈R2
(2x1,1 − x1,2 + 3)x1,1x2,1
+[(2x1,2)
2 + (x3,2)
2]x1,2
s .t . 1− xT1 x1 ≥ 0,
2nd player:

min
x2∈R2
[(x2,1)
2 − x1,2]x2,1
+[(x2,2)
2 + 2x3,2 + x1,2x3,1]x2,2
s .t . xT2 x2 − 1 = 0, x2,1 ≥ 0, x2,2 ≥ 0,
3rd player:

min
x3∈R2
(x1,1x1,2 − 1)x3,1 − [3(x3,2)2 + 1]x3,2
+2[x3,1 + x3,2]x3,1x3,2
s .t . 1− (x3,1)2 ≥ 0, 1− (x3,2)2 ≥ 0.
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The Lagrange multipliers can be represented as
λ2,1 =
1
2 (x
T
2∇x2f2), λ2,2 =
∂f2
x2,1
− 2x2,1λ2,1, λ2,3 =
∂f2
x2,2
− 2x2,2λ2,1,
λ3,1 = −
x3,1
2
∂f3
∂x3,1
, λ3,2 = −
x3,2
2
∂f3
∂x3,2
.
Applying Algorithm 3.6, we get the unique NE
x∗1 = (−0.3558,−0.9346), x
∗
2 = (1.0000, 0.0000), x
∗
3 = (−0.3331, 1.0000).
The accuracy parameter is −9.2310 · 10−9. It took around 9 seconds. If the third
player’s objective becomes −f1(x) − f2(x), then the NEP becomes a zero-sum
game and there is no NE. Algorithm 3.1 detected the nonexistence. It took around
3 seconds.
Example 5.4. Consider the 2-player NEP
1st player:

min
x1∈R2
2x1,1x1,2 + 3x1,1(x2,1)
2 + 3(x1,2)
2x2,2
s .t . (x1,1)
2 + (x1,2)
2 − 1 ≥ 0,
2− (x1,1)2 − (x1,2)2 ≥ 0
2nd player:

min
x2∈R2
(x2,1)
3 + (x2,2)
3 + x1,1(x2,1)
2
+x1,2(x2,2)
2 + x1,1x1,2(x2,1 + x2,2)
s .t . (x2,1)
2 + (x2,2)
2 − 1 ≥ 0,
2− (x2,1)
2 + (x2,2)
2 ≥ 0.
The Lagrange multipliers can be represented as (i = 1, 2):
λi,1 =
1
2
∇xif
T
i xi(2− x
T
i xi), λi,2 =
1
4
∇xif
T
i xi(1− x
T
i xi).
By Algorithm 3.6, we get the unique NE
x∗1 = (−1.3339, 0.4698), x
∗
2 = (−1.4118, 0.0820),
with the accuracy parameter −3.5186 · 10−8. It took around 5 seconds.
Example 5.5. Consider the NEP
1st player:
{
min
x1∈Rn1
∑
1≤i≤j≤n1 x1,ix1,j(x2,i + x2,j)
s .t . 1− (x21,1 + · · ·+ x
2
1,n1) = 0,
2nd player:
{
min
x2∈Rn2
∑
1≤i≤j≤n2 x2,ix2,j(x1,i + x1,j)
s .t . 1− (x22,1 + · · ·+ x
2
2,n2) = 0,
where the dimension n1 = n2. The computational results for cases n1 = n2 =
3, 4, 5, 6 are shown in Table 1. The time is displayed in seconds. The accuracy
Table 1. Computational results for Example 5.5.
n1 x
∗
1 x
∗
2 time
3 (−0.5774, −0.5774, −0.5774) (−0.5774, −0.5774, −0.5774) 1.31
4
(0.8381, 0.5024,
−0.0328, −0.2098)
(−0.1791, −0.0683,
0.4066, 0.8933)
62.85
5
(0.8466, 0.4407, 0.1744,
−0.0101, −0.2418)
(−0.1944, −0.0512, 0.1238,
0.3370, 0.9114)
682.67
6
(0.8026, 0.4724, 0.1799,
0.1799, −0.0637, −0.2527)
(−0.1979, −0.0772, 0.1091,
0.1091, 0.4040, 0.8762)
18079.99
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parameter ω∗ is respectively
−1.0689 · 10−7, −1.4459 · 10−9, −2.7551 · 10−9, −7.0354 · 10−9.
Because of the relatively large amount of computational time, we only compute one
NE for each case in the above.
We would like to remark that our method can also be applied to solve NEPs for
which the individual optimization has no constraints, or equivalently, the feasible
set Xi for (1.1) is the entire space R
ni . For unconstrained NEPs, the KKT system
(3.1) becomes
∇xifi(x
∗) = 0, i = 1, . . . , N.
The Algorithms 3.1 and (3.6) can be implemented in the same way.
Example 5.6. Consider the unconstrained NEP
1st player:
 min
n1∑
i=1
(x1,i)
4 +
∑
0≤i≤j≤k≤n1
x1,ix1,j(x1,k+x2,i+x3,j)
(n1)2
s .t . x1 ∈ Rn1 ,
2nd player:
 min
n2∑
i=1
(x2,i)
4 +
∑
0≤i≤j≤k≤n2
x2,ix2,j(x2,k+x3,i+x1,j)
(n2)2
s .t . x2 ∈ Rn2 ,
3rd player:
 min
n3∑
i=1
(x3,i)
4 +
∑
0≤i≤j≤k≤n3
x3,ix3,j(x3,k+x1,i+x2,j)
(n3)2
s .t . x3 ∈ Rn3 ,
where x1,0 = x2,0 = x3,0 = 1, and n1 = n2 = n3. We implement Algorithm 3.6 for
the cases n1 = n2 = n3 = 2, 3, 4, 5, 6. The computational results are shown in the
following table. For all cases, we computed a NE successfully and obtained that
x∗1 = x
∗
2 = x
∗
3 (up to round-off errors). There is a unique NE for each case. The
computational results are reported in Table 2. The time is displayed in seconds.
Table 2. The computational results for Example 5.6.
n1 x
∗
1 = x
∗
2 = x
∗
3 ω
∗ time
2 (−0.8410, −0.7125) −8.8291 · 10−9 0.34
3 (−0.6743,−0.6157,−0.5236) −6.6507 · 10−9 1.58
4
(−0.5950,−0.5606
−0.5097,−0.4363)
−1.0577 · 10−9 16.86
5
(−0.5476,−0.5247,−0.4919,
−0.4472,−0.3860)
−4.4438 · 10−9 177.63
6
(−0.5157,−0.4992,−0.4762,
−0.4457,−0.4060,−0.3534)
−3.7536 · 10−9 1379.27
The following are some examples of NEPs from applications.
Example 5.7. Consider the environmental pollution control problem for three
countries for the case autarky [7]. Let xi,1(i = 1, 2, 3) denote the (gross) emissions
from the ith country. The revenue of the ith country depends on xi,1, e.g., a
typically one is xi,1(bi −
1
2xi,1). The variable xi,2 represents the investment by
the ith country to local environmental projects. The net emission in country i
is xi,1 − γixi,2, which is always nonnegative and must be kept below or equal a
20 JIAWANG NIE AND XINDONG TANG
certain prescribed level Ei > 0 under an environmental constraint. The damage
cost of the ith country is assumed to be di(xi,1−γxi,2)+
∑
j 6=i ci,jxi,2xj,1. For given
parameters bi, ci,j , di, γi, Ei, the ith (i = 1, 2, 3) country’s optimization problem is
min
xi∈R2
−xi,1(bi −
1
2xi,1) +
(xi,2)
2
2 + di(xi,1 − γixi,2) +
∑
j 6=i
ci,jxi,2xj,1
s .t . xi,2 ≥ 0, xi,1 ≤ bi,
0 ≤ xi,1 − γixi,2 ≤ Ei.
We consider the general cases that bi 6= Ei. The Lagrange multipliers can be
expressed as
λi,4 =
1
(bi−Ei)Ei
(
∂fi
∂xi,2
xi,2(xi,1 − γixi,2)−
∂fi
∂xi,1
(bi − xi,1)(xi,1 − γixi,2)
)
,
λi,3 =
1
bi
(
(bi − xi,1)(
∂fi
∂xi,1
+ λi,4)− xi,2(
∂fi
∂xi,2
− γiλi,4)
)
,
λi,2 = λi,3 − λi,4 −
∂fi
∂xi,1
,
λi,1 =
∂fi
∂xi,2
+ γiλi,3 − γiλi,4.
We solve the NEP for the following typical parameters:
b1 = 1.5, b2 = 2, b3 = 1.8, c1,2 = 0.2, c1,3 = 0.3, c2,1 = 0.4,
c2,3 = 0.2, c3,1 = 0.5, c3,2 = 0.1, d1 = 0.8, d2 = 1.2, d3 = 1.0,
E1 = 3, E2 = 4, E3 = 2, γ1 = 0.7, γ2 = 0.5, γ3 = 0.9.
By Algorithm 3.6, we get the unique NE
x∗1 = (0.7000, 0.1600), x
∗
2 = (0.8000, 0.1600), x
∗
3 = (0.8000, 0.4700),
with the accuracy parameter −1.1059 · 10−9. It took about 10 seconds.
Example 5.8. Consider the NEP of the electricity market problem [9, 16]. There
are three generating companies, and the ith company possesses si generating units.
For the ith company, the power generation of his jth generating unit is denoted
by xi,j . Assume 0 ≤ xi,j ≤ Ei,j , where the nonzero parameter Ei,j represents its
maximum capacity, and the cost of this generating unit is 12ci,j(xi,j)
2 + di,jxi,j ,
where ci,j , di,j are parameters. The electricty price is given by
φ(x) := b− a(
3∑
i=1
si∑
j=1
xi,j).
The aim of the each company is to maximize its profits, that is, to solve the following
optimization problem:
ith player:
{
min
xi∈Rsi
1
2
∑si
j=1(ci,j(xi,j)
2 + di,jxi,j)− φ(x)(
∑si
j=1 xi,j).
s .t . 0 ≤ xi,j ≤ Ei,j (j ∈ [si]).
The Lagrange multipliers according to the constraints gi,2j−1 := Ei,j − xi,j ≥
0, gi,2j := xi,j ≥ 0 can be represented as
λi,2j−1 = −
∂fi
∂xi,j
· xi,j/Ei,j , λi,2j =
∂fi
∂xi,j
+ λi,2j−1. (j ∈ [si])
We run Algorithm 3.6 for the following setting:
si = i, a = 1, b = 10,
c1,1 = 0.4, c2,1 = 0.35, c2,2 = 0.35, c3,1 = 0.46, c3,2 = 0.5, c3,3 = 0.5,
d1,1 = 2, d2,1 = 1.75, d2,2 = 1, d3,1 = 2.25, d3,2 = 3, d3,3 = 3,
E1,1 = 2, E2,1 = 2.5, E2,2 = 0.67, E3,1 = 1.2, E3,2 = 1.8, E3,3 = 1.6.
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We found the unique NE
x∗1 = 1.7184, x
∗
2 = (1.8413, 0.6700), x
∗
3 = (1.2000, 0.0823, 0.0823).
The accuracy parameter is −5.1183 · 10−7. It took about 8 seconds.
6. Conclusions
This paper studies Nash equilibrium problems that are given by polynomial
functions. Algorithms 3.1 and 3.6 are proposed for computing one or all NEs. The
Lasserre type Moment-SOS hierarchy of semidefinite relaxations are used to solve
the appearing polynomial optimization problems. Under generic assumptions, we
can compute a Nash equilibrium if it exists, and detect the nonexistence if there is
none. Moreover, we can get all Nash equilibria if there are finitely many ones of
them.
Appendix
Appendix A. On the finiteness of KKT points for generic NEPPs
We discuss the finiteness of KKT points for generic NEPPs. This implies that
Algorithm 3.1 and 3.6 has finite convergence. After enumeration of all possibili-
ties of active inequality constraints, we can generally consider the case that (1.1)
has only equality constraints. Consequently, the length mi of the ith player’s con-
straining polynomials can be assumed less than or equal to ni, the dimension of its
strategy xi. To prove the finiteness, we can ignore the sign conditions λi,j ≥ 0 for
Lagrange multipliers. The KKT system for all players is
(A.1)
{ ∑mi
j=1 λij∇xigi,j(xi) = ∇xifi(x) (i ∈ [N ]),
gi,j(xi) = 0 (i ∈ [N ], j ∈ [mi]).
When the objectives fi are generic polynomials in x and each gi,j is a generic
polynomial in xi, we show that (A.1) has finitely many complex solutions.
Theorem A.1. Let di,j > 0, ai,j > 0 be degrees, for i ∈ [N ], j ∈ [mi]. If each gi,j
is a generic polynomial in xi of degree di,j and each fi is a generic polynomial in x
and its degree in xj is ai,j , then the KKT system (A.1) has finitely many complex
solutions and hence the NEP has finitely many KKT points.
Proof. For each player i = 1, . . . , N , denote
bi := ai,i − 1 + di,1 + · · ·+ di,mi −mi.
x˜i := (xi,0, xi,1, . . . , xi,ni), x˜ := (x˜1, . . . , x˜N ).
The homogenization of gi,j is g˜i,j, a form in x˜i. Let P
ni be the ni dimensional
projective space, over the complex field. Consider the projective varieties
Ui :=
{
(x˜1, . . . , x˜N ) ∈ P
n1 × · · · × PnN : g˜i(x˜i) = 0
}
, i = 1, . . . , N,
U := U1 ∩ · · · ∩ UN .
When gi,j are generic polynomials in xi, the codimension of Ui is mi (see [21]), so
U has the codimension m1 + · · ·+mN .
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The ith player’s objective fi is a polynomial in x = (x1, . . . , xN ), we denote the
multi-homogenization of fi(xi, x−i) as
f˜i(x˜i, x˜−i) := fi(x1/x1,0, . . . , xN/xN,0) · (
N∏
j=1
(xi,0)
ai,j ).
It is a multi-homogeneous polynomial in x˜. For each i, consider the determinantal
variety
Wi :=
{
x ∈ Cn
∣∣ rank[∇xifi(x) ∇xigi,1(xi) · · · ∇xigi,mi(xi)] ≤ mi } .
(The ∇xi denote the gradient with respect to xi.) Its multi-homogenization is
W˜i :=
{
x˜
∣∣ rank[∇xi f˜i(x˜) ∇xi g˜i,1(x˜i) · · · ∇xi g˜i,mi(x˜i)] ≤ mi } .
The matrix in the above can be explicitly written as
Ji(x˜i, x˜−i) :=

∂xi,1 f˜i(x˜) ∂xi,1 g˜i,1(x˜i) · · · ∂xi,1 g˜i,mi(x˜i)
∂xi,2 f˜i(x˜) ∂xi,2 g˜i,1(x˜i) · · · ∂xi,2 g˜i,mi(x˜i)
...
...
. . .
...
∂xi,ni f˜i(x˜) ∂xi,ni g˜i,1(x˜i) · · · ∂xi,ni g˜i,mi(x˜i)
 .
The (mi + 1)-by-(mi + 1) minors of the matrix Ji are homogeneous in x˜i of degree
bi. They are homogeneous in x˜j of degree ai,j , for j 6= i. By [42, Proposition 2.1],
when gi,j are generic polynomials in xi, the right mi columns of Ji are linearly
independent for all x˜i ∈ Ui. That is, for every x˜ ∈ Ui, there must exist a nonzero
mi-by-mi minor from the right mi columns of Ji. In the following, we consider
fixed generic polynomials gi,j.
First, we show that U ∩ W˜1 have the codimension n1 +m2 + · · · +mN . Let V
be the projective variety consisting of all equivalent classes of the vectors
(A.2) m1(x˜) := [x˜1]
hom
b1
⊗ [x˜2]
hom
a1,2
⊗ · · · ⊗ [x˜N ]
hom
a1,N
,
for equivalent classes of x˜ ∈ U . In the above, ⊗ denotes the Kronecker product,
[u]homd denotes the vector of all monomials in u of degree equal to d. In other
words, [u]homd is the subvector of of [u]d for monomials of the highest degree d.
Note that U is birational to V (consider the natural embedding ϕ : U →֒ V such
that φ(x˜) = m1(x˜)). So U and V have the same codimension [57]. For each subset
I ⊆ [n1] of cardinality m1, we use detI J1 to denote the m1-by-m1 minor of J1 for
the submatrix whose row indices are in I and whose columns are the right hand
side m1 columns. Then
W˜1 =
⋃
I⊆[n1],|I|=mi
XI where
XI := {x˜ : rankJ1(x) ≤ m1, detIJ1(x) 6= 0}.
For each I, we have x˜ ∈ XI if and only if the (m1 + 1)-by-(m1 + 1) minors of J1,
corresponding to the row indices I ∪ {ℓ} with ℓ ∈ [n1]\I, are equal to zeros. There
are totally n1 − m1 such minors. The vanishing of these (m1 + 1)-by-(m1 + 1)
minors of J1 gives n1 −m1 linear equations in the vector m1(x˜) as in (A.2). The
coefficients of these linear equations are linearly parameterized by coefficients of f1.
Therefore, when f1 has generic coefficients, the set
YI := {m1(x˜) : x˜ ∈ XI ∩ U}
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is the intersection of V with n1 − m1 generic linear equations. Since XI ∩ U is
birational to YI , they have the same codimension, so the codimension of XI ∩ U is
n1 +m2 + · · ·+mN . This conclusion is true for all the above subsets I. Since
U ∩ W˜1 =
⋃
I⊆[n1],|I|=m1
XI ∩ U ,
the codimension of U ∩ W˜1 is equal to n1 +m2 + · · ·+mN .
Second, we can repeat the above argument to show that
(U ∩ W˜1) ∩ W˜2
has codimension n1+n2+m3+ · · ·+mN . Let V ′ be the projective variety consisting
of all equivalent classes of the vectors
(A.3) m2(x˜) := [x˜1]
hom
a2,1
⊗ [x˜2]
hom
b2
⊗ [x˜3]
hom
a2,3
⊗ · · · ⊗ [x˜N ]
hom
a2,N
for equivalent classes of x˜ ∈ U ∩ W˜1. Note that U ∩ W˜1 is birational to V ′. They
have the same codimension. Similarly, we have
W˜2 =
⋃
I⊆[n2],|I|=m2
X ′I where
X ′I := {x˜ : rankJ2(x) ≤ m2, detIJ2(x) 6= 0}.
When f2 has generic coefficients, the set
Y ′I := {m2(x˜) : x˜ ∈ X
′
I ∩ U ∩ W˜1}
is the intersection of V ′ with n2 −m2 generic hyperplanes. Since X ′I ∩ U ∩ W˜1 is
birational to Y ′I , they have the same dimension, so the codimension of X
′
I ∩U ∩ W˜1
is n1 + n2 +m3 + · · ·+mN . This conclusion is true for all Y ′I . Since
U ∩ W˜1 ∩ W˜2 =
⋃
I⊆[n2],|I|=m2
X ′I ∩ U ∩ W˜1,
we know U ∩ W˜1 ∩ W˜2 has the codimension n1 + n2 +m3 + · · ·+mN .
Similarly, by repeating the above, we can eventually show that
U ∩ W˜1 ∩ W˜2 ∩ · · · ∩ W˜N
has codimension n1 + n2 + · · · + nN . This implies the KKT system (A.1) has
codimension n1 + n2 + · · · + nN , i.e., the dimension of the solution set of (A.1) is
zero. So, there are finitely many complex KKT points. 
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